HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 PER ANNUM. . . . . 35 CENTS PER NUMBER.

THE LAW SCHOOL. — The following table shows the registration of this autumn as compared with that of four preceding years: —

	1888–89	1889–90	1890–91	1891–92	1892–93
Third year	27	50	44	48	69
Second year . . .	65	59	73	112	119
First year	73	86	101	142	135
Specials	52	59	61	61	71
Total.	217	254	279	363	394

The number of new entries is 210, as against 205 a year ago.

The next table shows the make-up of four successive first-year classes, both geographically and as regards the holding of college degrees: —

HARVARD GRADUATES.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1892	27	2	17	46
1893	34	1	19	54
1894	30	2	17	49
1895	32	4	13	49

GRADUATES OF OTHER COLLEGES.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1892	3	5	21	29
1893	5	9	21	35
1894	7	20	38	65
1895	8	14	30	52

HOLDING NO DEGREE.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.	Total of Class.
1892	6	2	3	11	86
1893	4	1	7	12	101
1894	20	1	10	31	142
1895	16	3	14	34[1]	135

[1] One member of '95 gave no home address.

The decrease in this year's total is entirely due to the falling off — which was expected — in the graduates of Yale. In the class of '95 there are 7 Yale men, which, speaking generally, is a large number; last year's figure, 18, was thoroughly abnormal. Of the other colleges, Brown is the steadiest feeder, sending 6, as against 8 in the class of '94, and 5 in '93. Bowdoin sends none, as against 8 last year, and none two years ago. From Amherst, Williams, and Dartmouth there come 14, as compared with 3 and 11 respectively. Bates sends 3, and Trinity, Princeton, University of California, University of Iowa, and University of North Carolina, 2 each. From all six of these together, only 6 came in the two previous years.

Readers of the May number may recall a prediction that in 1892–93 the school would show an increase over 1891–92 of 50 at the very least. The first-year class and the special students, taken together, were expected to hold their own, and in fact they have done a little better than this. But it was predicted that the second year would gain about 29, and the third year about 26; whereas the actual figures are only 7 and 21 respectively. As regards the second year, it is enough to say that the class of 1893 was wholly exceptional, both in the number of new entries and in the remarkable unanimity with which the better men came back. The loss of fifteen per cent suffered by '94 is merely normal. But the estimate for the third year was more than conservative, because it allowed for a percentage of decrease more than a fifth larger than the average in recent classes. Yet it has proved too low.

At first sight, considering how hard the school has labored to build up its third year, this seems discouraging. An examination of the history of these classes (which cannot be given here in detail) indicates, however, a simple explanation, sufficiently suggested by the following table for the class of 1892: —

	Harvard Graduates.		Graduates of other Colleges.		Holding no Degree.	
Class of 1892.	From New England.	Outside of N. England.	From N. England.	Outside of N. England.	From N. England.	Outside of N. England.
First year	29	17	8	21	8	3
Second year . . .	31	14	6	10	7	5
Third year . . .	25	8	5	5	4	1

In the main, the class of 1893, and that of 1894 so far as it has gone, show the same tendencies. The former, in its first year, had 21 graduates of colleges other than Harvard coming from outside New England; in its third year it has 9. The class of 1894 had 38 of these last year, and has 29 now. That is to say, the most stable element in the School, without exception, is the body of Harvard graduates belonging to New England. The non-graduates, from whatever part of the country, are uncertain; a larger number proportionately are apt to fail — or practically to fail — in their examinations, through lack of training before entering. But the greatest loss suffered by a class is regularly among the college graduates — especially from other colleges than Harvard — who live outside New England. Some come from parts of the country where the need of the longer training has not been felt, and others from States — like New York and Minnesota — where one year of actual office work is a prerequisite for admission to the bar. It is natural that the former, and inevitable that the latter, should leave before the end of their course.

The one element in the School that does not increase, and probably will not increase, is the element that stays longest, — the contingent of Harvard men from Massachusetts. The recent growth has been chiefly among those who normally leave early. This indicates that the school is enlarging its field. There is every reason for being glad that the Harvard graduates, for two successive years, have been outnumbered on their own ground by men from other colleges; but this also means that the third year cannot with any reason be expected to increase proportionately.

A further step has been taken toward stiffening the requirements of the School, and, incidentally, toward diminishing its numbers. As the rules stood at the beginning of 1891–92, no *special student* could return to the School who had not passed in at least three subjects at the end of his first year. Last spring this was amended; no one, whether regular or special, was allowed to return unless he had passed in three subjects at the end of his first year. But if a man stood the test then, there was nothing to prevent him (if a regular student) from remaining a member of the second year as long as he liked. The restriction has now been made general. No student whatever, in any class, can come back unless he passed in at least three subjects at the preceding examinations. This cuts off men who make a bad failure in the third year, but return to try again for the degree.

By this change, not only the same requirements for entrance,[1] but the same rules as regards remaining apply to regular and special students throughout. Henceforth, therefore, no particular reference will be made in the catalogue to the latter, and, for all practical purposes, they will disappear. If a man who is qualified to join a regular class prefers to call himself a special, and be registered as such, he can do so, but he will gain by it no advantage whatever.

The New York Court of Appeals has adopted a new rule in regard to candidates for admission to the New York Bar. Time spent at a law school will not be accepted in lieu of any part of the three required years of clerkship, unless a certificate is presented from the school stating that the student's attendance has been regular throughout the entire period covered.

This has necessitated an arrangement by which men who intend to apply for admission in New York, register every day at the office in order to qualify themselves for a certificate, — a decided innovation.

The Law School Association prize for 1891–92 was not awarded. In consequence, the same three subjects are offered again, namely: —

(1) The rights and remedies of a corporation or its stockholders in respect to contracts *ultra vires*.

(2) To what extent is equity a system, not merely of remedies, but of rights?

(3) The fictions of the law: have they proved useful or detrimental to its growth?

The competition is open to members of the present third-year class, or graduates of last June. No essay is expected to contain more than fifty pages of manuscript of legal quarto size, and none will be received after

[1] See 6 Harvard Law Review, 99, May, 1892.

April 15. The address of the Secretary of the Association is 220 Devonshire Street, Boston.

The report has been widely circulated that the Harvard Law School tried and failed to secure the entire library of the late N. C. Moak, Esq., which is to go to Cornell. There is no truth in this. The School did not make any such effort, because by far the greater part of Mr. Moak's library — in particular the foreign and colonial reports — would have duplicated what is either already on the shelves at Cambridge, or is to be there very shortly.

Among the acquisitions picked up in England this summer by Mr. Arnold is a set of English, Scotch, and Irish peerage reports, which, with one exception, is probably the most complete in existence. It numbers about three hundred volumes, many of them in manuscript.

Damages for Mental Suffering. — In view of the progress that has been made in recent years in clarifying the subject of damages for mental suffering and extending their scope, it is a disappointment to find the latest case (Chapman *v.* Western Union Tel. Co., 46 Alb. Law J. 409) losing sight of fundamental distinctions which seemed to be at last clearly established. The plaintiff in this Georgia case is the sendee of a telegram which informed him of the desperate illness of his brother, and requested him to come. The message was delayed, in consequence of which the brother died before the plaintiff's arrival, and this action is for the statutory penalty plus damages for mental suffering. To so much of the petition as relates to damages for mental suffering the defendant demurs, and the Supreme Court holds that the demurrer was rightly sustained, — properly enough, since in Georgia failure to deliver a telegram is not in itself, apart from the statutory penalty, a cause of action for the sendee; and mere suffering, whether mental, physical, or pecuniary, gives no right to recompense unless some right is infringed.

But the court is not satisfied merely to decide the case. They go on to deny the existence of any general rule allowing damages for mental suffering. They explain the cases where such damages were allowed by the old law, such as assault and false imprisonment without contact, on the ground that the offence in these cases is wilful, and the damages punitive. They then cite cases denying the right to recover for mental suffering in cases much like the one at bar. Undoubtedly the old law would have precluded damages for mental suffering in such a case, even if there had been a right of action, — as there would have been if the plaintiff and sufferer had been the sendor. If they had followed this older rule with a clear understanding of the ground on which the rule that is now so widely adopted rests, we could find fault only with their judgment.

Why go on, however, with objections that have been answered with the greatest clearness, perhaps nowhere more clearly than in a book they quote themselves, only to misunderstand, — Sedgwick on Damages. "In Lynch *v.* Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 557, Lord Wensleydale expressed the opinion that when the only injury is to the feelings, the law does not pretend to give redress. Though Mr. Sedgwick (Dam. § 43 *et seq.*) seeks to restrict this language to the case then before the court, and disputes its accuracy as a general proposition, it may be doubted whether the learned author is